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21 November 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Current Intelligence

SUBJECT : The OCI Role in Support of the Presidential Trip, 17 October - 2 November 1966

1. The Director of Current Intelligence on 10 October established a Presidential Trip Task Force in OCI (OCI Notice No. 50-81) to be responsible for all intelligence production in support of President Johnson's Far Eastern Trip. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] was named chief of this task force, which was to remain in being until the President departed South Korea for the United States on 2 November 1966. The complete roster of task force personnel, all but two of whom were drawn from the Far East Area, is attached as Appendix A.

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2. Prior to the President's departure on 17 October, members of the task force prepared current situation memoranda on the countries to be visited--New Zealand, Australia, Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and South Korea. These were designed to present in concise form the salient political and economic facts and problems of each country and were coordinated with ONE and ORR.

3. Task force personnel also coordinated the drafts of SNIE's prepared by ONE on security conditions in the various countries to be visited and attended Board meetings on these Estimates.

4. With the publication of the SNIE's, OCI assumed responsibility for current reporting on security conditions, with particular attention to pending developments that could endanger or otherwise adversely affect the President or his party. Security memoranda, coordinated with ONE and the clandestine services, were published on a pre-departure schedule of 11, 14 and 16 October.

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[REDACTED]

The OCI task force also established contact points within OCI and with other DDI and clandestine services components for the rapid servicing of the Presidential party.

6. At 0800 on 17 October, the task force began round-the-clock operations with its headquarters in the Situation Room of the Operations Center. The majority were assigned to the 0800-1630 shift, in anticipation, subsequently proved correct, that because of time differences between Washington and the field the bulk of our work would occur then. One person was assigned to each of the 1630-2400 and 2400-0800 shifts. This also helped to conserve our assets, making available more area experts for calls at night to satisfy any requests from the field.

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7. The task force began daily publication of security memoranda on 17 October.

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[REDACTED]

The memoranda were later published in hard cover by the Directorate of Intelligence.

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8. Another daily cable assembled by the task force was the Presidential Trip Sitrep. This was designed to cover any Manila Conference-oriented material and any developments related to the trip, such as reactions from world capitals. The handling procedure for the sitreps was essentially the same as that of the security memoranda. However, these were coordinated only with ONE.

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9. The Central Intelligence Bulletin, the daily Vietnam Situation report, the Daily Brief, and the weekly Vietnam report [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] were used extensively [REDACTED]

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10. Spot analyses of important developments--a Chinese Communist nuclear test, [REDACTED] and a rebellion in Laos--were prepared [REDACTED]

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11. Liaison with the DDP task force, which was also operating on a 24-hour basis, and with ONE went extremely smoothly, aided both by the proximity of their offices and their consistently cooperative attitudes.

12. In Appendix B can be found some additional comments and observations on the functioning of the task force which could be of some use to future exercises.

[REDACTED]

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Chief, Orient Division

APPENDIX A

OCI PRESIDENTIAL TRIP TASK FORCE

ROOM: Situation Room, Operations Center, 7 F 27 (enter 7 F 33)

EXTENSIONS: B -- 5737 and 5738

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R -- 1883 and 9301

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PERSONNEL

OTHER OFFICE EXTENSION

HOME PHONE

B-5244; R-9456

B-7454; R-9340

B-7564; R-9106

B-7565; R-9106

B-7565; R-9106

B-7565; R-9106

B-7565; R-9106

B-7507; R-1362

B-6068; R-1362

B-6068; R-1362

B-6068; R-1362

B-6068; R-1362

B-5642; R-1417

NOTE: The roster of those Indochina Division persons on call for night duty will also be maintained in the Situation Room.


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Presidential Trip Task Force Roster

17 October	<u>0800-1630</u>	<u>1600-2400</u>	<u>2400-0800</u>
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18 October	A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H, I,J,K,L	M	N
19 October	do.	do.	do.
20 October	do.	do.	do.
21 October	do.	do.	do.
22 October	C,E (Area Rep), K	do.	do.
23 October	do.	do.	H .
24 October	A,B,C,D,E,F,I,J, K,L	G	do.
25 October	A,B,C,D,E,F,I,J, K,L,N	G	do.
26 October	do.	M	do.
27 October	do. & G	do.	do.
28 October	A,B,C,D,E,F,G,I J,K,L,N	do.	do.
29 October	B,F,J & Area Rep	do.	G
30 October	do.	do.	do.
31 October	A,B,C,D,E,F,H,I J,K,L,N	do.	do.
1 November	do.	do.	

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APPENDIX B

1. The writer, having been associated with three OCI task forces during the last two years, would like to emphasize the importance of organizational planning to the smooth functioning of the force once under way. In the case of the Presidential Task Force, this was made easier by the fact that there was approximately a two week notice of the impending trip; when one is plunged suddenly into a crisis situation, the shaking down period is obviously more painful.

2. The roster of this task force comprised primarily the SEA and JKT Branches, most of whose personnel had a direct interest in and knowledge of the countries to be visited. At the outset it was impossible to foresee precisely the workload that would be entailed, but the Office was prepared to expand the roster as needed. In assigning personnel to the various shifts an attempt was made, as noted earlier, to ensure that the area experts, particularly those on the countries involved, would be on hand during the daytime hours, and would also be available for calls at night. At least two persons staffed the Situation Room during the day to scan incoming material, prepare outgoing cables, and answer the telephone. In general it was found advisable to draw at least one of these persons from the country currently being visited. Day-to-day arrangements for these assignments were made with a view also to keeping the analysts' regular offices properly staffed and normal tasks accomplished. The arrangement of materials on clipboards and the maintenance of a log and a complete file of publications enabled other task force members to bring themselves up-to-date quickly after absences from the room.

3. Flexibility of assignment to duties within a task force also has an educational aspect. Considerable benefits can accrue from an analyst's exposure to the production techniques for varying publications and to the intricacies of the Operations Center. The task force chief himself has the obligation not only of supervising and coordinating all activities but also of stepping in where necessary to facilitate production. The former responsibility can usually be carried out best if he does not become too entangled in any one project.

4. Timing is of over-riding importance to a task force such as this. The product is only as good as its timely receipt. We found it most helpful to have a chart posted on the wall detailing the Presidential party's arrival and departure times in terms of Washington time, and to have another table showing the necessary filing times for each day's products [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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5. A final point, obvious though it may be, should be made. This is that the efficiency of a task force is increased to a great degree by its location within the Operations Center, where full advantage can be taken of the machinery and distribution system of the Center and the presence of the CSDO there, and of the proximity of the D/OCI, DD/OCI and their staffs. No one arrangement results in such a saving of time in the production and dissemination processes.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
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2	D/OCI		EDY
3	<i>file</i>		
4			
5			
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